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CHAPTER 10 
Accountability and Reform in 
the Aftermath of the 
Westray Mine Explosion 
Eric Tucker 
DEATH IN THE DOMINION 
The Westray mine exploded on May 9, 1992 killing all 26 miners who were 
working underground at the time. It quickly became apparent that the explosion 
was not an unforeseeable accident, but rather the predictable result of unsafe and 
unlawful mining practices, and lax regulatory enforcement. Inadequate ventilation 
allowed methane concentrations to reach explosive levels and coal dust had been 
permitted to accumulate. A spark, most probably from an underground mining 
machine striking a rock, ignited the gas, growing into a rolling methane flame that 
in turn ignited the coal dust, causing a coal-dust explosion. The mine inspectors 
knew of these hazardous conditions. During the summer of 1991, without making 
a formal order, they demanded that the company produce a stone-dusting plan to 
address the coal-dust hazard. By March 1992 nothing had been done. At that time 
the inspectors first became aware of dangerous levels of methane, but nothing was 
done. The next inspection took place on April 29, 1992. Finding that the coal dust 
problem still had not been addressed, the inspector finally issued a formal order 
requiring the company to clean up the hazard immediately and to produce a 
coal-dusting plan by mid-May. Ten days later, the mine exploded (Glasbeek and 
Tucker 1993; Jobb 1994; Richard 1997). 
Within a short time of the explosion, the victims' families, trade unionists, 
and others began demanding accountability and reform. They wanted to know who 
was responsible for creating the hazardous conditions in the mine and why they 
had been allowed to persist. This demand for accountability was not just directed 
at individuals, but also at organizations and systems. Numerous institutions of 
redress were mobilized: an inquiry was established; criminal charges were laid 
against Curragh Inc. (the legal owner of the mine) and two of its on-site managers; 
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workers' compensation payments were made to the surviving families; damage 
actions were brought by the families of the dead miners; and campaigns were 
conducted to change the law. Yet, more than I 0 years later, no individual or 
organization has been held criminally or civilly liable for the deaths of the miners 
and the occupational health and safety (OHS) regime has changed little. In 
2003, however, the criminal law was amended by the so-called "Westray Bill," 
which purports to make the prosecution of health and safety crimes easier. In 
short, it seems that while legal accountability was evaded, and the reform-inducing 
producing potential of this disaster was partially blunted, the specter of egregious 
criminality going unpunished for apparently technical reasons so threatened the 
legitimacy of the law that legislators eventually felt compelled to respond. This 
chapter seeks to explain how this happened. 
It begins with a model that identifies some key factors that influence 
responses to disasters. The model is then applied to the Westray aftermath, 
examining in greater detail the prosecution of criminal charges, compensation 
to the victims' families, the inquiry's recommendations in regard to the OHS 
regime, and regulatory and legislative changes. The final section draws some 
brief conclusions. 
DETERMINANTS OF THE PUBLIC OUTCOMES OF 
OHS DISASTERS: A WORKING MODEL 
While there is now a large body of literature that explores the causes of 
disasters, much less attention has been paid to the study of their effects on public 
policy. This chapter proceeds from.the assumption that once an event has come to 
be socially constructed as a work disaster (see earlier chapters) it has a potentially 
disruptive social effect; it may generate demands that individuals and organi-
zations, typically celebrated for their entrepreneurial finesse and lauded for their 
contribution to the economic well-being of society, be branded as wrong-doers 
or criminals for the harm their wealth-producing activities have caused. As well, 
such events may make visible and call into question, in a dramatic and public 
way, the acceptability of the existing OHS regime and the criminal laws that 
apply to corporate misconduct in the workplace. Thus, there is a need to inquire 
into the factors that influence whether and to what extent work disasters will be 
crisis producing in the above senses. 
It is also necessary, however, to explore the factors that influence the state's 
ability to manage these crisis tendencies. How and to what extent are state 
institutions and actors able to contain political harm and reassure the public that 
the government is not giving employers and corporations special treatment? 
How and to what extent can those who demand redress effect a de-legitimation of 
existing institutional arrangements and their underlying assumptions and social 
relations, and obtain redress? Figure 1 depicts a model for studying both these 
sets of OHS disaster outcome determinants. 
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Figure 1. Determinants of the public outcomes of a working disaster. 
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The starting point is the pre-disaster OHS/criminal law regime and the 
broader social context in which it operates. The OHS regime most obviously 
includes the laws that directly regulate the work environment and the institutional 
arrangements for their implementation and enforcement. Workers' compensation 
systems are also part of this regime because they almost invariably aim to 
influence OHS outcomes, either through education and promotion programs or 
through their funding mechanisms (e.g., experience-rated premiums or penalty 
assessments). In some jurisdictions, tort law also forms part of the OHS regime 
insofar as the threat of litigation influences the behavior of employers and workers. 
In addition to legal and institutional arrangements, I have also included as part 
of the OHS regime the dominant ideological assumptions that shape regulatory 
decision-making and behavior. These include the beliefs of regulatory officials 
about the causes of hazardous working conditions, the compatibility or worker 
and employer interests, and social relations of production. The criminal law has 
been partially hived off from the OHS regime because it is not typically construed 
as part of it. This is because the behavior that results in worker deaths and injuries 
is not viewed with the same seriousness as analogous wrongdoing committed 
outside the workplace. Of course, this is a purely ideofogical construction, but one 
with a long historical lineage (Tucker 1990, pp. 66-75). It is, however, currently 
being challenged. 
The model presupposes that OHS regimes do not operate apart from or 
independently of the social context in which they are located, and are shaped by 
and, to a lesser extent, shape that context. The work of Paul Shrivastava (I 987) on 
Bhopal is relevant here for its insistence that technological and organizational 
systems must be located in their broader social context in order to appreciate both 
their risks and the possibility of averting future industrial crises. Here, too, the 
relation between the OHS regime and its social context is vital to our model 
because it permits a better understanding of why the regime operated in the manner 
that it did prior to the disa.ster and of the regime's vulnerability to de-legitimation 
in the disaster's aftermath. It is hypothesized that when an OHS regime enjoys 
near hegemonic status or faces opponents who are poorly positioned to challenge 
it, the crisis potential of disasters is less likely to materialize in significant and 
effective pressure for change. 
The next locus of inquiry is the characteristics of disaster itself, including 
the number of workers killed or injured, whether the harm is confined to the 
workplace or spreads to members of the broader community, and its time frame 
(e.g., a traumatic event inflicting immediate harm as opposed to the slow onset of 
hann from long-term exposures or the accumulation of single instances of harm). 
These characteristics, however, are only meaningful because they are imbued 
with significance through social and institutional processes and must be under-
stood in the broader social context in which they occur. For example, to the extent 
that workplace deaths have been naturalized, even when they involve single 
incidents that kill many workers at once, the crisis-producing potential of the 
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incident-which may not even be socially construed as a disaster-will be 
diminished. But it is also hypothesized in this model that there is an interactive 
relationship between the disaster and the social. context, such that a disaster 
may produce shifts in the balance of power, alter perceptions of the legitimacy 
of the existing regimes of regulation or governance, and generate different 
organizational and strategic responses. These interactions will vitally influence 
the impact of the disaster on the institutional mechanisms for redress (including 
legislatures, courts, commissions of inquiry, administrative agencies, and legis-
latures). This is because the identification of objectives and the ability of social 
actors to achieve them will depend on a variety of social forces and processes. 
The work of Renn (1992) using the social arena metaphor is helpful here. Renn 
argues that to be successful groups must mobilize social resources, including 
money, power, social influence, value commitment, and evidence. His emphasis 
on the scope for political action and the plurality of social resources helps avoid 
reductionist tendencies present in more structural accounts of policy processes. 
However, while Renn recognizes that resources are unequally distributed and 
that arenas operate under certain constraints, his focus on environmental harms 
and their more broadly dispersed effects, in conjunction with a generally liberal-
pluralist perspective, leaves untheorized the structural basis for unequal resource 
distribution or the nature of the constraints operating within policy arenas. These 
lacunae· in Renn's approach become major omissions in the context of OHS 
where class and class conflict are often central. Therefore, a political economy 
approach will be used to deepen the analysis of the operation of social arenas 
(Nichols 1999; Pearce and Tombs 1999). 
From this perspective, it is absolutely essential to recognize that the over-
whelming majority of the immediate victims and their families are working-class. 
Writers such as Michael Reich (1991) have demonstrated that, in the aftermath 
of disaster, victims and their families are drawn out of their private worlds and 
become involved "in another world of problems, conflicts identities and insti-
tutions" as they seek redress (Reich 1994, p. 181). They will frequently form 
associations to represent and advance their common interests before the insti-
tutions of redress. Often, they will be joined and supported by trade unions, 
especially when the victims were trade-union members themselves. However, 
the goals of victims' groups and trade unions may not be identical, as the 
former may be more immediately concerned with individual and organization 
accountability for the deaths and compensation while the latter may be more 
strongly focused on system accountability and reform of the OHS regime to 
better protect health and safety in the future. In the aftermath of a disaster, both 
groups are likely to be better positioned than at other times to mobilize political 
and ideological resources that will shift the balance of power in favor of redress 
and regime reform. 
It is important, however, to recognize that working-class actors are likely to 
face significant opposition unless their demands stay with.in narrow and accepted 
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channels. The disaster-employer in particular and employer organizations in 
general also can be expected to mobilize. They will do so to defend themselves 
against legal liabilities, adverse ideological and political effects, and unwanted 
legal and institutional changes. However, in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster, their ability to mobilize social resources may be weakened, especially if 
there is prima facie evidence that the disaster-employer's failure to meet its 
legal obligations to its victim-workers was an operative cause of the disaster. 
Notwithstanding such disruptions of normal politics, we must keep in mind that 
any resulting power re-balancing will take place within a larger political economy 
that is unlikely to have been fundamentally altered by the disaster. The structural 
power imbalances between labor and capital will still be operative and exert a 
continuing influence over efforts to re-negotiate the OHS health and safety regime 
and its underlying assumptions. 
Disaster politics are often conducted in a number of distinct institutional 
settings or policy arenas, each of which has its own particular possibilities and 
constraints. Criminal trials, civil actions, administrative decision-making, public 
inquiries, and legislatures use different procedures and are bound by different 
decision-making rules. For example, the rules of evidence and those defining the 
burden of proof are different in criminal trials than in tort actions and public 
inquiries. These systems also place different limits on the chains of causality that 
can be pursued. As well, some social resources are formally permitted to operate 
in some institutions but not others. For instance--at least in theory-the outcome 
of a criminal trial is not to be influenced by money or social influence, but 
only by evidence of a certain kind. Judges are meant to be neutral and a number 
of formal safeguards are in place to immunize them from outside influences. 
Decision-making is to be guided by prescribed rules. In contrast, decisions 
of legislatures are formally open to lobbying, petitions, and other kinds of 
political influence. 
Lastly, the model's analysis must be attentive to the different forms of 
redress that actors might be seeking and that institutional processes can produce. 
Thus, it will often be the case that efforts are being made to seek compensation, 
punish the offenders, and reform the OHS regime, all at the same time. Not only 
are some of these goals more achievable than others, but we must also be cognizant 
of the formal and informal interactions between these goals and the institutions 
invoked to achieve them. While it is not necessarily the case that the pursuit of 
one goal comes at the expense of another, we cannot ignore the fact that actors 
have finite amounts of energy and resources and, for a variety of legal reasons, 
efforts in one arena may limit those in others. However, it may also be the case 
that the outcome in one arena may influence outcomes in others and, in par-
ticular, that the failure to hold individuals and organizations accountable for 
egregious wrongdoing may reinforce demands for legal reforms that address 
the accountability gap. 
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REDRESS IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
THE WESTRAY DISASTER 
The Pre-Disaster OHS Regime and 
Its Social Context 
Nova Scotia, like all other Canadian jurisdictions, adopted an OHS regime 
of mandated partial self-regulation (Rees 1988; Tucker l 995a). An essential 
characteristic of this regime is that it requires employers and employees to 
self-manage their health and safety according to certain legally prescribed 
processes and standards (the so-called internal responsibility system or IRS) 
while also maintaining a system of direct state regulation (the so called external 
responsibility system or ERS). In Canada, the IRS provides a role for worker 
participation through the right to know, the right to participate in mandatory 
bipartite local health and safety committees, and the right to refuse unsafe work. 
The ERS imposes duties on employers and employees through statutes and 
regulations that are enforceable by inspectors and through prosecutions. 
Within these broad parameters, mandated partial self-regulation can assume 
many different forms. Two crucial variables are the strength of worker partici-
pation rights and the balance between internal and external responsibility systems. 
The Nova Scotia variant, adopted in 1985, took a particularly restrictive approach 
to the right to refuse. It provided that workers could not refuse because of dangers 
that were "inherent" in the job and that work refusals could not continue after 
a unanimous joint committee had determined that the work was safe or labor 
department officials had advised the employee to return to work. Confusion 
about the right to be paid during a work refusal further reduced the willingness 
of workers to exercise it (Nova Scotia 1985).1 The external responsibility system 
in Nova Scotia was also a weak one. Neither old mine safety statutes, nor industrial 
and construction safety regulations were updated. In addition, the maximum 
fine under the Act was on the low end of the spectrnm ($10,000). More impor-
tantly, the government adopted an enforcement policy that depended almost 
exclusively on persuasion. Between 1985 and 1990, a total of 14 prosecutions 
were undertaken for violations of health and safety laws and the largest fine 
imposed was $2,500. Not a single mining company was prosecuted, notwith-
standing the fact that 1037 formal directives were issued to mine operators 
to correct violations of health and safety laws between 1987-88 and 1991-92 
(Glasbeek and Tucker 1993, p. 25). 
The weak powers granted to workers in the IRS and the lacks of enforcement 
in the ERS are justified on the assumption that employers and workers have a 
common interest in respect of OHS. It is posited that, to employers, "reasonable" 
safety pays and that "reasonable" employees should be satisfied with that level 
of safety. As a result, social relations between employers and workers should 
be cooperative and the parties should be able to self-regulate without significant 
284 I WORKING DISASTERS 
external intervention. The emergence of conflict is constructed as a sign of 
deviance, either on the part of an employer who fails to understand that the 
expected level of safety pays, or on the part of employees who are irrational in their 
demands for safety or who may be using OHS to achieve other (e.g., collective 
bargaining) objectives. 
These institutional arrangements and ideological assumptions are rooted 
in a local political economy that is best characterized by its underdevelopment 
(Brym and Sacouman 1979). The Nova Scotia economy has been heavily 
dependent on the export of staples into volatile and increasingly unfavorable 
world markets. As a result, governments ha've been particularly anxious to 
attract would-be investors to provide much needed jobs. Moreover, these 
conditions have adversely affected the Nova Scotia labor movement, which has 
gone from being one of the strongest and most militant in the country to being 
much less effective and influential (Earle 1989). As a result, organized labor 
in Nova Scotia has not been particularly aggressive on OHS issues and has 
not challenged the assumptions and practices embedded in the regime. As 
well, the Conservative Party had dominated provincial politics, holding office 
continuously from 1956 to 1993, leaving the labor movement with little 
political leverage. 
These conditions set the stage for the Westray mine disaster. Not only 
were the developers of the mine able to extract very sizeable government loan 
guarantees and favorable contract commitments to purchase its coal, but during 
the approval process their mining plans were not scrutinized by officials to 
determine if they could be executed safely. The top priority of politicians was to 
secure funding for and approval of the project, and regulatory officials implicitly 
understood these priorities. The mine developer's main concern was coal 
production, but it continually encountered setbacks in meeting its goals. As a 
result, pressure was placed on local managers to get the coal out, fostering a 
culture of risk-taking and a cavalier attitude toward safety (Cooke 2003). Regu-
latory officials responsible for monitoring mine safety and adherence to approved 
plans consistently failed to ensure that detected breaches of regulatory require-
ments were rectified (Glasbeek and Tucker 1993; Jobb 1994; Richard 1997). 
As hazardous. conditions became manifest, experienced miners quit when they 
saw that their concerns were not going to be addressed by management and that 
the inspectors were not going to take effective action to force the company to 
operate safely. The growing fears of the remaining inexperienced and non-
unionized Westray miners remained "private trouble" (Comish 1993; Mills 
1959, p. 8)-until it was too late. 
Mobilizing the Institutions of Redress 
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion on May 9, 1992 it was not known 
whether there were any survivors. As rescue teams rushed into action, intensive 
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media attention focused on the unfolding drama. Although from the outset, the 
company devised a media strategy that aimed to deflect blame from itself, it could 
not contain the flow of information about the miners' prior expressions of concern, 
the issuance of orders by the mine inspectors, and the failure of the company to 
comply with those orders (Richards 1998). As it became clear that no miners 
survived and that human agency rather than ineluctable natural forces caused the 
explosion, there was widespread questioning of the efficacy and legitimacy of the 
existing regime of OHS regulation and a demand that responsible individuals and 
institutions be held to account. And so a multitude of institutions of redress were 
mobilized in response to demands for accountability and reform. One of the 
immediate influences of the disaster on the balance of social forces was that it gave 
rise to a new and important voice: the victims' families. Many of them formed the 
Westray Families Group to pursue their demands for justice. In so doing, they were 
drawn out of their private worlds into the public sphere, taking on an unfamiliar 
and uncomfortable role that they felt compelled to assume if only to vindicate the 
reputations of their loved ones against suggestions that the men were responsible 
for what had happened (Dodd 1998, 2001). The labor movement, particularly the 
United Steelworkers of America (USW A), which was in the midst of an 
organizing drive at the Westray mine at the time of the explosion,2 also assumed an 
active role in demanding redress. 
Against this background, Donald Cameron, the Conservative Premier of the 
province at the time, promised a public inquiry. Within days after the suspension 
of the rescue effort, Cameron appointed Mr. Justice Richard to head up an inquiry 
under the Public Inquiries Act and the Coal Mine Regulation Act. The provincial 
auditor commissioned a private consultant (Coopers Lybrand) to conduct a review 
of management practices at the Department of Labor, and the Nova Scotia 
Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Council, representing both labor and 
management, was commissioned to review the Occupational Health and Safety 
· ' Act (OHSA) and its regulations and to make recommendations for reform. A police 
investigation was commenced as well and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP) took control of the mine site 12 days after the explosion. That fall, 
charges were laid against the employer under the provincial OHSA but were 
subsequently dropped in April 1993 after the employer (Curragh Corporation) 
and two local managers, Gerald Philips and Roger Pany, were charged with 
manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death. The entitlement of the 
surviving family members under the province's workers ' compensation law was 
never in question and so that aspect of compensation was handled routinely 
and without much controversy. Workers' compensation, however, is a no-fault 
system, so no findings of blame or responsibility were made. The level of 
compensation is set by legislation, and it neither fully reimburses victims and 
their families for their economic loss, nor awards punitive or other non-economic 
damages. As a result, the surviving families launched a civil action against 
Curragh, its board of directors, Clifford Frame (Curragh' s chief executive officer), 
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the manufacturers of machinery used in the mine, and the governments of 
Nova Scotia and Canada. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed account of the 
conduct and fate of each mechanism of redress (Jobb 1999; Tucker 1995b). 
Rather, the focus here is on the broader question of their outcome and the social 
and institutional forces that shaped these results. Although it is somewhat artificial 
to draw a sharp line between accountability and reform, since mechanisms for 
holding individuals and organizations accountable (e.g., the civil and criminal 
law) may also be seen to have systemic effects on the OHS regime, and since 
some responses, like inquiries combine these functions (often uneasily), it is 
nevertheless useful for our purposes to draw this distinction. 
Accountability 
Partial Compensation, but No Fault-A prominent demand of victims in the 
aftermath of a disaster is that they be compensated for their losses, both economic 
(e.g., lost income) and non-economic (e.g., pain and suffering). Redress of this sort 
is typically obtained through the workers' compensation and/or the tort system.3 
Victims may also look to the tort system as a means of holding individuals and 
organizations publicly accountable for their actions because the couit must deter-
mine that there was intentional or negligent conduct before it can award damages. 
Some also believe that the tort system can promote systemic change by deterring 
potential wrongdoers who will wish to avoid being named and blamed, and to pay 
damages to the victims. This section examines the ability of the Westray families 
to mobilize these systems and achieve their objectives of obtaining compensation, 
holding individuals and organizations accountable for their wrongdoing, and 
deterring such behavior in the future. Their experience will be related to broader 
debates about the responsiveness of these institutions to workers' concerns in 
the aftermath of a disaster and their potential effectiveness as an element of the 
OHS regime. 
Workers' compensation in most Canadian jurisdictions compensates sur-
viving family members for their economic losses reasonably well. Compensation 
is payable without the need to prove that death was the fault of the employer 
and, where the work-relatedness of the death is obvious as in the Westray case, 
administrative officials make entitlement detenninations quickly so that com-
pensation payments start shortly after the loss occurs. Payment is made out of a 
state-administered insurance fund paid for by employer premiums. Payment is 
secure, even in the face oflarge claims in the aftermath of disaster, and lawyers are 
rarely involved in the claims process, so none of the compensation payments are 
lost to legal costs. 
Under Nova Scotia law as it stood at the time of the Westray explosion, 
widows were entitled to a life pension calculated at 75% of pre-accident gross 
earnings up to a maximum of $36,000. Because the percentage is based on gross 
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rather than net earnings, the widows' pension will replace nearly all of the lost 
income, provided the deceased worker made no more than the maximum. In the 
case of the Westray miners, most were earning more than the maximum, and as a 
result the widows are not being fully compensated for the loss of their partners' 
income. However, these benefits are indexed to ensure that they keep pace with the 
cost of living and the level of the pension will increase as the maximum earnings 
cut-off is increased in the future. Survivors also get an additional monthly payment 
for each child that continues until age 18 or, if the child remains in school, to 25. 
In addition, the families of the deceased miners received a lump sum death 
benefit of $15,000 and $4,000 for funeral expenses. A spokesperson for the NS 
workers' compensation board estimated that it would pay out $15 million in 
benefits, but that this could increase to $25 or $26 million, depending on inflation 
and future increases to the maximum pension level (COHSN, 8 Feb. 1993). 
Although the workers' compensation did not fully replace the families' 
economic losses, its performance in response to the Westray disaster did not attract 
significant criticism,4 despite the widespread discontent of No~a Scotia workers 
with the system's treatment of workers with permanent disabilities and _appeal 
backlogs. Indeed, neither the Westray families nor the labor movement mobilized 
in pursuit of legislative or administrative reforms in response to the Board's 
handling of the Westray claims.5 These groups also recognized, and implicitly 
accepted, that the design of the system does not provide for assignment of blame or 
the award of exemplary damages, that it pays very little compensation for non-
economic losses, and that it has little deterrent effect.6 
Because of these limitations, disaster victims often find the tort system 
attractive, as did a number of Westray families. They commenced a $30 million 
damage action against the employer (Curragh Corporation), out-of-province 
manufacturers of equipment used at the mine, the Governments of Canada and 
Nova Scotia, and the mines' inspectors. However, this lawsuit faced a formid-
able legal barrier. In Nova Scotia and other Canadian jurisdictions, workers' 
compensation laws severely limit the right of injured workers and their survivors 
to sue. The statutory bar precludes actions against the worker's employer and any 
other employer covered by the province's workers' compensation legislation. 
It also forecloses actions against employees of covered employers. 
The action against Curragh was subsequently dropped, both because it 
stood no chance of being allowed to go ahead and because Curragh was bankrupt. 
The lawsuit against out-of-province equipment manufacturers was also dropped, 
not because it was barred by statute, but because the families were advised 
that it would take years to resolve and would be very costly to pursue (Bell v. 
Canada (Attorney General) 2001). This left the governments of Nova Scotia 
and Canada as defendants. 
In 1998, following the report of the Westray Inquiry, the Westray families 
initiated settlement talks with the Nova Scotia government, lowering their damage 
claim $12.6 million. After much delay, the government announced in December of 
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that year that it would not offer an out-of-court settlement. This was consistent with 
its position that it did not accept legal liability for the disaster. The government 
subsequently moved to have the action against it dismissed on the grounds that it 
was an employer under the statute and, therefore, protected by the statutory bar. 
The status of the government as a protected employer under workers' com-
pensation statutes had recently been before the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers ' Compensation Board) (1997) where the 
court held that it was reasonable for the WCB to conclude that the government 
was protected by the statutory bar, notwithstanding that it was being sued in 
its capacity as regulator and not employer. While this left open the possibility 
that different conclusions might be reached by workers' compensation boards 
in other jurisdictions, the court's holding undoubtedly strengthened the Nova 
Scotia government's position that the statutory bar protected it. 
In dismissing the families ' action, Mr. Justice Davison began his analysis 
with a quote from the dissenting judgment of Justice L'Heureux-Dube in. 
Pasiechnyk: 
The tragic factual circumstances that have led to these proceedings are 
irrelevant to the ... legal question at issue. (1997, p. 920) 
Having established the requisite emotional distance, Davison J. then dryly 
parsed the applicable statutory language and rules of interpretation, concluding 
that the government is an employer for the purpose of the statute and is thus 
protected against tort claims by injured employees. The effect of this judgment 
also precluded an action against the provincial inspectors, because the bar also 
protects employees of covered employers from civil liability. The Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal upheld Davison J. ' s judgment and the Supreme Court of Canada 
denied leave to appeal. Although the families vowed to fight on (Brooks 2002), 
they have no real prospect of advancing their suit and so it is extremely unlikely 
that tort litigation will help achieve their goals of obtaining a formal assignment of 
blame and additional compensation, or deterring future employers and govern-
ments from creating and/or tolerating unsafe working conditions. 
Clearly, even in the face of what a court might characterize as gross negli-
gence by the employer and the mines inspectors, the victims were unable to 
convince the government that it should voluntarily pay additional compensation 
or to persuade the judiciary to open the door to tort litigation. Moreover, they 
were unable to mobilize broader support for their demands, so that neither the 
government nor the court (nor for that matter, the law it was interpreting) has 
faced much criticism, suggesting that in Canada, unlike the United States, civil 
actions against employers and governments are not widely viewed as an avenue 
of redress that victims of workplace disasters should be entitled to pursue.7 
Given this outcome, the Westray experience adds little to debates over the 
tort system's efficacy in delivering the kinds of redress that it is, at least in 
principle, institutionally capable of providing to disaster victims. However, a few 
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brief comments are still in otder.8 First, the goals of denunciation, compensation, 
and deterrence are only advanced if the appropriate defendant is found to be 
at fault. Although the onus of proof is on the plaintiff, unlike in a criminal 
proceeding, it is enough to prove liability on a balance ofprobabilities. As well, 
corporate defendants will be held vicariously responsible for the negligent acts 
of their officers and employees. Finally, the discovery process assists the plaintiff 
in getting information from the defendant. Still, plaintiffs face serious hurdles, 
including the fact that, in the first instance, they bear the cost of gathering and 
presenting the evidence. Moreover, well-off or well-insured defendants who 
have a significant stake in the litigation will take advantage of the tort system 
to delay proceedings and increase the plaintiffs costs. In short, there are sig-
nificant obstacles to holding individuals and organizations accountable through 
the tort system. 
Second, it is not clear that success in litigation would produce more 
compensation for victims. The workers' compensation board would have been 
subrogated to the action and entitled to reimbursement for its expenses out of 
the proceeds. Thus, the plaintiffs would only be better off to the extent that the 
tort damages exceeded the workers' compensation award and, according to one 
recent assessment, that outcome is unlikely (Hyatt and Law 2000, pp. 338-351). 
Third, the deterrent effect of tort is premised on the desire of potential 
torfeasors to avoid the shame attached to civil blame, as well as its financial cost. 
How strong are these effects? If the case is successful, a finding against the 
defendant is one that attaches blame and, while it does not have the same 
significance as a guilty verdict in a criminal trial, it can still cause embarrassment, 
especially when the court finds there has been reckless disregard for human life in 
the pursuit of profit. However,just as in a criminal trial, it is likely that the case will 
be presented in such a way as to emphasize the deviance of the defendants, rather 
than the systemic nature of hazardous working conditions (see Johnstone, ch. 8 
this volume). So, contrary to the claims of Bale (1989), successful tort actions are 
unlikely to undermine the legitimacy of the systems that encourage the creation of 
hazardous work enviromnents. Moreover, because the defendant is most likely a 
corporation, individual officers and managers will escape personal blame. 
Perhaps even more than shame, the deterrent effect of the tort system rests on 
its supposed ability to impose significant financial costs on wrongdoers, thus 
creating an incentive for persons engaging in potentially hazardous activities 
to take greater care to avoid causing harm to others. The empirical support for 
this hypothesis, however, is thin. First, as Ison argued, the tort system is a 
"forensic lottery" that delivers compensation to only a fraction of those who 
have valid claims (Ison 1967). Second, although exemplary and punitive damages 
are becoming more common in Canada, they are still rare and usually modest 
(Feldthusen 2000, Whiten v. Pilot Insurance 2002), and damages for pain and 
suffering have been capped. Third, most defendants are likely to be insured, so 
that they will probably not have to bear directly the cost of the damage award 
r 
I 
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(Atiyah 1997). Fourth, even if the award exceeds the insurance coverage, 
defendants facing large damage awards have developed an anay of strategies, 
including bankruptcy protection, to reduce their financial exposure. 
In sum, if the Westray families had been able to sue successfully for damages, 
they would have gained whatever satisfaction comes from having a formal deter-
mination of fault made by a court. However, it is unlikely that they would have 
been that much further ahead financially or that the detenent effect of a successful 
lawsuit would have been very significant (Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock 1996, 
ch. 6). It is even less likely that the litigatio!l would have challenged the under-
lying ideological assumptions and institutional arrangements that contribute to 
the problem of unhealthy and unsafe work. 
Crime Without Punishment- Criminal prosecutions are first and foremost 
a way of holding individuals and, to a lesser extent, organizations such as cor-
porations accountable. The choice of wrongs that are deemed to · be of such a 
serious nature that they warrant criminal sanctions as oppose.d to private remedies 
through civil actions is a deeply political and ideological one. Historically, the 
criminal law has not been applied against employers whose actions have caused 
death and injury to their workers. In part, this is because employment relations 
are viewed as a realm of voluntarism in which workers assume some risk of 
injury in exchange for wages. Because this consensus view info1ms much of 
contemporary OHS regulation, it has been argued that the use of criminal sanc-
tions against employers becomes a means of challenging the conventional wisdom 
and promoting system reform (Glasbeek 1988). 
The Westray criminal prosecutions were a legal disaster from start to finish 
(Jobb 1999). The Nova Scotia government initially refused to assign a full-time 
crown attorney to the case, despite a plea from the RCMP to do so. The two 
prosecutors finally appointed in September 1992, three-and-a-h~lf months after 
the disaster, complained that they were not provided with the most basic resources 
·needed to do their job properly, leading them to resign in February 1993. This 
contributed to a slip-up whereby the prosecution failed to obtain a court order 
needed to retain evidence seized from Curragh pursuant to a search warrant. In 
response to an application from Curragh's lawyers, the prosecution was given one 
month to lay charges or hand over the evidence. So, on April 20, 1993, the RCMP 
announced that Curragh Corporation and two of its onsite managers, Gerald 
Phillips and Roger Parry, were being charged with manslaughter and criminal 
negligence causing death. However, those charges were subsequently quashed 
in July 1993 by a provincial judge who found them too vaguely worded R v. 
Curragh Inc. 1993). New charges were filed shortly thereafter and these survived 
legal challenge R v. Curragh Inc. 1994). 
By then, a new legal team had been put in charge of the prosecution and had 
been given a budget to enable it to manage the mass of evidence that was involved 
in this complex case. The trial began in February 1995. The defense repeatedly 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM I 291 
claimed that it had not been given adequate disclosure of Crown evidence as 
required by Canadian law. The case was dragging ahead slowly when the presiding 
judge, Robert Anderson, phoned the head of the prosecution service to detnand 
the removal of the lead prosecutor. The Crown demanded a mistrial but was 
refused by Justice Anderson. The Crown secured an emergency hearing before 
the Supreme Court of Canada on April 5 but this Court detennined that it 
had no jurisdiction to intervene in the midst of a trial (R. v. Curragh Inc. 1995a). 
The trial resumed before Justice Anderson and continued until June, when he 
granted a defense motion to stay the charges because of the faih.u·e of the Crown 
to disclose key evidence about methane sensors and coal dust samples (R. v. 
Curragh Inc. 1995b). 
The Crown appealed Anderson's ruling to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. 
In its judgment, issued in December 1995, the court ruled that Anderson's 
behavior gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and ordered a new trial 
(R. v. Curragh Inc. 1995c). A new prosecution team was assigned to the case and 
given additional resources, much of which were devoted to cataloguing the 
mass of documents in the Crown's possession in order to avoid future dis-
closure problems. The defense challenged the Court of Appeal's decision 
before the Supreme Court of Canada. Its judgment was issued in March 1997. 
A 7-2 majority upheld the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial, agreeing 
that the trial judge's conduct had created an apprehension of bias (R. v. Curragh 
Inc. 1997). The majority did not comment directly on the Crown's failure 
to disclose, but it did order the Crown to pay the defendants' reasonable 
legal costs.9 
The Director of Public Prosecutions in Nova Scotia, however, was losing his 
enthusiasm for a case that was already absorbing a significant portion of his 
office's budget and that threatened to become even more costly. Moreover, by 
then the commission of inquiry (see infra., p. 295) had issued its report which 
attributed the explosion to a persistent pattern of disregard for basic mine safety 
and a breakdown ofregulatory systems. Guilt was pervasive. Following the com-
mission's report, one of the prosecutors, Jack Hagell was asked to prepare a report 
assessing the strength of the Crown's case. His recommendation, given in October 
1997, was that the charges be withdrawn because it would be "fundamentally 
unfair" to prosecute only Phillips and Parry when many others, including miners, 
foremen, and government inspectors, shared responsibility for the explosion. 
Hagel! was also critical of the investigation and the early handling of the case. 
While Hagell withdrew from further involvement with the case, his colleagues 
labored on. A further internal assessment estimated that the prosecution would 
cost in the vicinity of $10 million, that there was no consensus on the likelihood 
of conviction, and that a jail sentence was unlikely even if there was a convic-
tion (McCormick 1999b, p. 21). In July 1998 the Nova Scotia Justice Minister 
announced that the criminal charges were being stayed and would not be revived. 
A prosecution could not be pursued under provincial OHS laws either because 
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the Crown had previously stayed charges in order to clear the way for the 
criminal prosecution. 
While the immediate causes of the failure of the Westray prosecution were a 
combination of incompetence and lack of political and fiscal support for the effort, 
it would be wrong to assume that successful criminal prosecutions are usual in the 
aftermath of a health and safety disaster in Canada or elsewhere (Hopkins 1989; 
Slapper 1999). For example, in twentieth century Canada, research to date has 
uncovered only 10 instances in which employers were charged with criminal 
offences in relation to dangerous working conditions, and only one conviction that 
withstood appeal (Law Reform Commission of Canada 1986; Tucker 1995b). 
In 1943, Brazeau Collieries Ltd. was convicted of criminal negligence after 29 
coal miners died in a methane gas explosion. Chief Justice Ives imposed a fine of 
$5,000. He justified this small penalty because of the "close and friendly asso-
ciation between mine officials and miners" (Calgary Herald 19 January 1943; 
Rex v. Brazeau Mines 1942). 
Why has the criminal law been so marginal to OHS regulation and why is 
it so hard for it to be deployed as mechanism to denounce and punish employer 
wrongdoing in the aftermath of a disaster? 
There are at least two levels of explanation for criminal law's separation from 
the OHS regime: the sociological and the legal-institutional. According to many 
radical criminologists, the criminal law does not stand in an external relation to 
society, but rather is a product of and an instrument for maintaining unequal social 
relations. As a result, there has been enormous resistance in capitalist societies 
to categorizing wrongdoing by the economically powerful as criminal activity 
(Chambliss and Seidman 1971; Pearce 1976; Pearce and Tombs 1999; Slapper 
1993; Taylor, Walton, and Young 1973). Resistance is particularly high when 
it is alleged that an employer has committed a crime in the course of profit-
making workplace activity. This is because of the underlying assumptions that 
employment relations are consensual and that employees accept some level of risk. 
This, after all, is one of the justifications for the IRS. A criminal charge represents 
a social judgment about the unacceptability of certain risks and does not permit 
individual consent to them. As such, its use in the employment context is anomalous. 
This closure, however, is never complete in liberal societies that also embrace 
the ideal of equality before the law and some commitment, however thin, to 
minimum standards of social welfare for all citizens. So while the deep-seated 
assumption that capitalist production gone wrong is to be treated differently than 
an~logous behavior occurring in other contexts that are not similarly valued 
is rarely questioned during normal times, workplace and other disasters often 
produce a popular demand for justice that, in the Anglo-American context, is 
increasingly fulfilled through the prosecution and punishment of wrongdoers 
under the criminal law (Wells 1995, ch. 7). io This was certainly the qlse in the 
aftermath of the Westray disaster. Although trade unions and the Westray Families 
Group took the lead in making this demand, they gained pol?ular support as 
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knowledge of the employer's reckless behavior became widespread through 
media reports. Thus, the very act of charging an employer or its agents with a 
criminal offense challenges the nonnative order, throwing into question assump-
tions about common interests between workers and employers and challenging 
the legitimacy of profit-maximizing behavior (Glasbeek 1984). 
The symbolic importance of criminalizing employer misconduct, however, 
virtually ensures that attempts to do this will encounter institutional resistance 
and that powerful actors will mobilize to limit the threat. This points toward the 
second level of explanation that focuses on legal and institutional impediments 
to successful prosecutions of corporate/capital crime. The large body of literature 
on this subject can only be touched upon lightly here. One problem that com-
mentators have identified is that of assigning criminal responsibility to individuals 
who act within a corporate structure that is designed to shield individuals from 
legal liability. Connecting high-level corporate officers and directors to the crime 
can be a difficult task in an organization in which responsibility is diffuse and 
in which operational decisions are taken by lower-level officials in the corporate 
hierarchy (Tombs 1995). Collecting evidence from the boardroom and weaving " 
together a coherent and compelling story for the jury that will implicate senior 
corporate actors is likely to be such a time-consuming and daunting task that 
police and prosecutors are hesitant to proceed. Of course, it is also possible to 
prosecute the lower-level corporate officials, such as the on-site managers, for 
their personal wrongdoing (as was done in the case of Westray), but this may 
be resisted by prosecutors and judges who feel that it is unfair to let the small 
fry take the blame when the big fish have gotten away. 
It is often assumed that it is easier to prosecute the corporation itself rather 
than particular corporate officials. This has been facilitated by developments in the 
criminal law that, for example, allow corporations to be prosecuted for mens rea 
offenses such as manslaughter. However, the complexity of such cases still is 
great. According to the headnote in the leading Ontario case on the subject, "[a] 
corporation is responsible for the criminal acts of its servant only ifthe servant has 
authority, express or implied to do the act, or ifthe servant is virtually its directing 
mind in the sphere of duty assigned to him so that his actions and intent are the very 
actions and intent of the corporation itself, provided that in performing the acts in 
question the agent was acting within the scope of his authority, either express 
. or implied" (R. v. McNamara et al. (No. 1) 1981). However, as in the case of 
prosecuting individuals, the cost and difficulty of gathering evidence necessary to 
prove all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt is likely to be great. 
Corpor~tions and senior company officials have the resources to mount a vigorous 
defense, ensuring that their rights are scrupulously respected and using the com-
plexity of the corporate organization to undermine the prosecution's case. This 
means that the prosecution will have to be prepared to devote considerable 
resources to the case, often when it is operating under fiscal restraints. Resource 
allocation decisions are also likely to be influenced by underlying attitudes 
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about the appropriateness of prosecuting corporate actors in the first place, by 
direct political considerations, and by doubts about whether the game is worth 
the candle when a conviction will be difficult to obtain and, if the corporation 
is the accused, there is literally no body to punish (Benson 2001; Coffee 198 i; 
Geis & DiMento 1995; Slapper 1999). Often, as in the case of Curragh, the 
corporation will have ceased to exist or other creditors will have seized its 
assets, making any fine impossible to collect. 
Finally, the theory of criminal liability in these cases is likely to be that 
the employer behaved in a reckless manner. To increase the probability of 
success, the prosecution is likely to adopt a strategy of decontextualization and 
individualization. Rather than emphasizing the broader context that promotes 
the behavior in question, or drawing attention to the frequency of unlawful 
employer conduct, both the prosecution and the media will tend to focus on 
the particular facts of the case and to characterize corporate defendants as 
bad apples in what is a generally good barrel (Johnstone, ch. 8 this volume; 
McMullan and Hinze 1998). Thus, even in those rare cases where the popular 
demand for justice overcomes the deeply ingrained resistance to seeing respect-
able members of the employing classes condemned as pariahs for their undisci-
plined pursuit of profits resulting in death and destruction, there is a danger that 
a conviction will be interpreted as an affirmation, rather than a critique, of the 
normative order. 
So while the problems encountered in the Westray prosecution initially look 
idiosyncratic, upon closer examination the failure of the criminal prosecution in 
that case appears typical of the criminal law's response to corporate/capital 
wrongdoing. The public outcry in the immediate aftermath of the disaster pushed a 
reluctant government to pursue a criminal investigation and to file charges, but the 
initial failure to provide the necessary resources resulted in legal missteps that 
nearly saw the charges dismissed and produced substantial delay. By the time 
those problems were resolved-nearly five years after the explosion- a 
differently constituted government, under marginally less public pressure, was not 
prepared to commit substantial resources to a prosecution whose outcome was 
uncertain and that targeted two low-level managers of a now bankrupt corporate 
employer. This failure of accountability produced a demand for criminal law 
reform, which will be examined in the next section of the chapter. 
Reform 
Public Inquiry: Naming, Blaming, and Recommending More of the Same-
Inherent in criminal trials and tort actions is a focus on the actions of particular 
defendants. Thus, any broader impact of a successful prosecution or law suit 
will be indirect, either by contributing to a shift in the way people view health and 
safety in the workplace, or through general deterrence. Public inquiries, however, 
usually have a broader mandate. While they too search for accountability, they 
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make no legal determination~ of wrongdoing. Rather, they typically look for 
systemic problems and make recommendations aimed at preventing their recur-
rence. Because of their different mandate, inquiries .are not conducted according 
the rules that govern trials: they are not restricted by .rules of evidence; partici-
pation in the proceedings is relatively open; and it is not up to those who are 
seeking particular recommendations to prove its factual predicate on a balance of 
probabilities. For these reasons, public inquiries can be an important institution 
through which to raise issues of organizational and social accountability for 
events, and to influence the public thinking and the future direction of state policy 
(Roach 1995). 
Almost inevitably, inquiries of one sort or another are established in the 
aftermath of a mining death, so there is little difficulty in activating this institution 
of redress. Legal impediments, however, still may arise. There has been recent 
concern that provincial inquiries aimed at alleged wrongdoing of specific 
individuals are invalid because they are tantamount to criminal proceedings, a 
matter within federal jurisdiction. As well, the power of inquiries to compel 
individuals to testify has been challenged in respect of persons facing criminal 
charges on the ground that it would violate their right to remain silent. Both of 
these issues were raised in respect of the Westray inquiry. Ultimately, th~ Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal upheld the authority of the province to call the inquiry on 
the ground that its dominant purpose was to make findings in respect of a 
coal-mine disaster rather than to investigate whether a criminal offence had been 
committed (Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry) 1993), and the 
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the right of the commissioner to compel testi-
mony from persons facing c~iminal charges because of the importance of the 
public interest at stake and because they were protected against having that 
testimony or derivative evidence used in a subsequent trial (Phillips v. Nova Scotia 
(Commission of Inquiry) 1995). This litigation delayed the start of the inquiry's 
public proceedings until November 1995, three-and-a-half years after it was 
established. Although the inquiry ultimately did not hear from senior Curragh 
officials and Phillips or Parry, the two local officials still facing criminal charges at 
the time, 11 71 witnesses testified in 76 days of well-publicized hearings, incl~ding 
the former Premier, the mine inspectors, former Westray miners, and families of 
the deceased miners. It also received numerous written submissions, including 
ones from the Westray families, the USW, and other labor organizations. 
Its report, released in November 1997, was scathing in its criticism of the 
operators of the Westray mine and of the government for failing to properly 
regulate and stop their dangerous and unlawful mining practices. In respect of 
Curragh, the commission found that "it created a workplace that fostered a 
disregard for worker safety .. . . [M]anagement's drive for production, together 
with its disdain for safety, played a key role in the devastation of the Westray 
mine" (Richard 1997, p. 135). The commission's condemnation of the govern-
ment's failures started at the top with Donald Cameron, the premier at the 
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time, who in his testimony had blamed the miners for the explosion. Cameron's 
explanation was characterized as "self-serving, cynical and simplistic" (1997, 
p. 222) and his aggressive pursuit of the project was seen to have sent a signal to 
the bureaucracy that Westray was to be given special treatment. The departments 
of Natural Resources and Labor, which had direct oversight of the mining, 
were both found to be derelict in meeting their statutory responsibilities. The 
commission made 73 reconunendations to the Nova Scotia government, which 
accepted them all within days of the inquiry's report (Nova Scotia 1997). 
The Westray families, trade unions, and the media welcomed the report's 
findings (e.g., Halifax Daily News 7 December 1997). For the families, the 
exoneration of the men from blame in their own deaths and the condemnation 
of Curragh and Cameron was particularly satisfying (Dodd 2001 ), while the 
unions, particularly the USW, were pleased with the reconunendations to increase 
corporate accountability (King 1998). However, despite its angry condemnation 
of employer misbehavior and govenunent inaction, the report failed to confront 
many of the underlying structural conditions and ideological assumptions that 
make the production of unsafe conditions and government non-enforcement so 
common (Tucker 1999). 
Almost totally missing from the report was any discussion of the relation 
between safety and profit. Of course, the pursuit of both safety and profits is 
not necessarily inconsistent: safe production methods will sometimes enhance 
profitability. But the potential for conflict is always there, especially in a situation 
where those immediately responsible for production are under pressure to show 
a profit in the short run. Instead of addressing this problem, the report makes it 
magically disappear: 
Once a mine is open, there begins the process of trade-off between production 
and safety. From the chief executive officer to the miner at the working face, 
the objective must be to operate the mine in a manner that ensures the personal 
safety of the worker over the economic imperatives of increased production. 
The two seemingly competing concepts-safety and production-must be 
so harmonized that they can co-exist without doing harm to each other. 
(Richard 1997, p. viii) 
But how are they to co-exist? The answer is given on the next page. The Westray 
management "through either incompetence or ignorance, lost sight of the basic 
tenet of coal mining: the safe mining of coal is good business'' (Richard 1997, 
p. ix). So, after all, there is no need for a trade off. But if safe production is 
always good business, then, given the tragic history of coal mining disasters 
and the high frequency of work-related death and disease in the industry, one is 
at a loss to explain why mine operators have tended to be such ignorant or 
incompetent business people. 
This understanding of the production of OHS hazards contributes to ~he 
report's faulty analysis of the failure of the government inspectors to enforce the 
.:: ;' 
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Jaw. Richard claimed that it was an erroneous understanding of the IRS that "was a 
major deterrent to effective enforcement of the safety regulations" (Richard 1997, 
p. 455). The error lay in ascribing to inspectors the .role of being persuaders and 
facilitators whose mandate was to promote the capacity of the workplace parties 
to assume primary responsibility for OHS in the workplace. The problem with 
this analysis, however, is that Richard failed to recognize that this approach to 
enforcement is not a corruption of the IRS model but rather is a manifestation of 
its ordinary operation. Even in Ontario, which has the most OHS prosecutions 
in Canada, the emphasis is on the promotion of self-reliance and inspectors 
almost never launch a prosecution until after a worker has been killed or seriously 
injured as a result of a violation of OHS laws and regulations. The reason for 
taking this approach is the core belief that workers and employers share a 
common interest in OHS and therefore should, with a little gentle persuasion 
and advice from the inspector, be able to self-regulate. Thus, despite Richard's 
denunciation of the failure to enforce in this particular case, the report embraces 
a model wherein the very behavior he criticizes is the norm. It is telling that 
Richard makes no specific recommendation in his report that the inspectors 
should use their coercive powers more frequently against employers who are 
found to be in violation of the law. Instead, the Inquiry recommended that an 
independent consultant should be retained to evaluate the inspectorate and its 
personnel (Richard 1997, rec. 56). 
Ironically, the Westray Inquiry proved to be more effective at holding 
individuals and organi~ations accountable (even though it could not impose 
sanctions) than it was at interrogating critically the system of OHS regulation that 
arguably fostered the unacceptable behavior it condemned so strongly. Indeed, the 
thrust of its report was that the existing OHS system was fundamentally sound, if 
badly managed. The Westray Inquiry is not unique in this regard. For example, 
Susan Dodd's study of mine disaster inquiries in Nova Scotia found that mine 
inquiries have tended to reflect the conventional wisdom of their time (Dodd, 
ch. 9 this volume). Why does this happen? 
As our model suggests, an important reason is that, as with other state and 
legal institutions, public inquiries do not stand in an external relation to society. 
While they are, in legal principle, both independent of government ~nd civil 
society, and therefore free to challenge conventional wisdom and to recommend 
major system reform, they also face institutional and social constraints that 
shape their outcomes. Liora Salter notes iti her study of public inquiries that 
there is a contradiction between their radical potential and their often disappoint-
ingly limited results (Salter 1990). She points to the widespread practice by 
governments of appointing commissioners who they see as "sound." Often, as 
in the case of the Westray Inquiry, they are judges who, as a group, are likely 
to be fairly conservative in their outlook. Moreover, Salter argues, there is an 
implicit understanding by the commissioners that their mandate is to produce a 
report that the government of the day will find acceptable and act upon. These 
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appointment practices and understandings promote self-censorship and the 
dominance of narrow pragmatism. These tendencies are further reinforced by the 
appointment ofresearchers and other commission staff members whose views are 
well within the mainstream and, therefore, will be unlikely to promote critical 
perspectives. It is notable, for example, that the Westray Inquiry hired Ian 
Plummer, Ontario's former Chief Mines Inspector, who espouses a view of the 
IRS that minimizes the importance of worker participation and empowerment 
(Plummer, Strahlendorf, and Holliday 1999), to advise it on the IRS model. 
The overall result is that public inquiries often function as schemes of 
legitimation (Ashforth 1990; Sheriff, 1983). They listen to society and speak to 
the state, but the vision of the common good that they advance has been filtered 
through a conservative understanding of proper social relations and the role of 
government. Legitimation, however, cannot simply be produced in a top-down 
manner, divorced from social reality. Rather, the inquiry process is part of a 
two-way conversation between state and society, albeit one that is mediated in 
the ways we have described. Still, the very legitimacy of the public inquiry 
itself derives, in part, from its public hearings at which interested groups are 
given the opportunity to express their views, as well as from its responsiveness 
to expressed concerns. Indeed, the utility of public inquiries to government is 
not limited to their pacification effect, but also comes from their ability to 
communicate to government the boundaries of what is politically acceptable in 
the aftermath of a disruptive event like a disaster. So, from time to time, the 
conservative institutional tendencies of inquiries are overcome, systems are held 
accountable, and more wide-sweeping recommendations are made (McEvoy 
1995). The likelihood of this happening may partially be a function of the 
idiosyncrasies of individual commissioners, but a more important influence is 
the ability of victims' groups and their supporters to use the disaster to articulate 
a critical perspective and to translate the heightened moral authority they enjoy 
into popular support for system changes. 
Neither was done very successfully in the aftermath of the Westray disaster. 
In part this was because the Westray Families and the labor movement were 
understandably focused on the need to hold individuals and organizations 
accountable (and to rebut assertions by the Premier, Donald Cameron, that the 
miners themselves were at fault). Of course, that was not their exclusive concern, 
but it was the one that tended to take precedence and for which public support was 
highest. Also significant was the fact that the labor movement does not have a 
unified position on OHS regulation. While many OHS activists were sharply 
critical of the current regime, a significant number of trade union leaders have 
embraced it, seeing it both pragmatically as the best deal they can cut politically, 
and as a means of providing workers with a voice in the workplace and in 
government, even if only as junior partners. As a result, the labor movement 
has tended to support modest modifications to, rather than radical critique 
of, the current regime. Indeed, even before the Westray Inquiry reported, the 
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province's OHS law had been amended, pursuant to a series of recommendations 
produced by a biparti.te advisory council (see below). 
In sum, as in the Aberfan disaster (McLean and Johnes 2000), existing 
corporatist arrangements undercut the potential of the disaster to call into question 
the legitimacy of the OHS regime. Instead, public attention was focused on the 
personal and organizational failures of the mine operator and the government 
regulators. Under these conditions, the normal institutional tendencies of public 
inquiries to reflect, repair, and reproduce dominant understandings operated with 
little opposition. 
Changing the OHS Law and Its Administration: More of the Same?-Not 
only does government set in motion institutions of redress like public inquiries; it 
provides redress directly through its own actions, whether through legislation or 
administrative action in response to recommendations from other bodies or on 
its own initiative. As we already noted, the Nova Scotia government immediately 
accepted all the recommendations that were within its authority to implement, 
including the appointment of a consultant to review the inspectors' actions. 
But even before the inquiry had started, in December 1992, the government 
initiated a review of the province's health and safety laws by the Nova Scotia 
Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Council (NSOHSAC), a bipa1tite 
labor-management body. They issued their consensus report, entitled Taking 
Responsibility (NSOHSAC 1995), a little over two years later. 
The report largely endorsed the underlying principles and practices of the 
existing IRS. Employer and worker cooperation was expected to be the norm and 
the role of the government was to clarify the responsibilities of the workplace 
parties and support their effo~s, resorting to enforcement only when necessary. 
The recommendations aimed to better institutionalize this system by, for example, 
providing better access to information and improving training for joint health 
and safety committee members. The issue of worker empowerment, however, 
was not touched upon, except in the call for greater clarity about the right of 
workers refusing unsafe work to be paid. Some recommendations were made 
in respect of enforcement, including an increase in the level of fines, but nothing 
was said about the level and intensity of enforcement activity. These recom-
mendations were embodied in Bill 13, passed without dissent in 1996 by the 
then-Liberal government. · 
In the world of OHS regulation, however, administrative practice is at least 
as important as formal legislation. While the inspectors directly involved with 
Westray were terminated, it is questionable whether the division has adopted a 
fundamentally different approach to enforcement. Data from the annual reports of 
the OHS Division of the Department of Environment and Labor (Nova Scotia, 
various years) indicate that since 1996-97 (the first year for which systematic 
data are available) the annual number of inspections and stop work orders has 
fluctuated, but the number of orders has more than doubled (see Table 1 ). As 
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Table 1. Nova Scotia, Department of Labor, Occupational Health and 
Safety Division Enforcement Activity, 1996-97-2000-04 
1996- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2002- 2003-
97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 
General inspections 1368 1288 1022 1563 1897 1287 1039 1460 
Orders issued 2684 3754 4276 6976 8610 5860 6692 7034 
Stop work orders 126 80 167 202 144 137 141 123 
Prosecutions 12 8 14 32 14 24 28 45 
Work refusals 10 rn 24 18 8 ? ? ? 
Source: Nova Scotia, Department of Environment and Labor, OHS Division, 2003-04. 
well, in the past few years there has been an increase in the number of prosecu-
tions. These data suggest some improvement in the enforcement effort, but there 
is need for caution in their interpretation. 
For example, the 2001 report of the Nova Scotia Auditor General raised 
numerous concerns about the department's enforcement practices: the department 
only had a little more than one-third of the businesses in the province in its tracking 
system; at the current rate of inspections it would take ten years to complete a 
full cycle of inspections; the department lacked a rigorous approach to targeting 
higher-risk workplaces; there was inadequate follow-up of compliance orders 
issued; resource limitations could result in suspected offenders not being 
prosecuted; finally, there were not adequate procedures in place to monitor the 
work activity of inspectors (NS Auditor General 2001, ch. 9). In 2003-04 the 
depa1tment reported that there was still an ongoing problem of achieving timely 
compliance with orders. As well, it reported that nearly two-thirds of prosecutions 
were in the construction industry. Fines for convictions are generally low; the 
average was less than $10,000, while the highest was a fine of $45,000 levied 
against the province's Ministry of Transport and Public Works. The largest fine 
against a private sector employer was $28,000. As well, the department also 
reported that there is still significant non-compliance with the requirements of 
the IRS. Although the situation has improved in recent years, in 2003-04 one-third 
of employers with 20 or more employees failed to meet each of five measures 
of IRS compliance. 
. In short, while the Westray mine disaster forced the government to acknowl-
edge that its practice of OHS regulation was deficient, the underlying assumptions 
that supported those practices were not seriously called into question. The few 
groups that raised concerns about unequal power relations in the workplace and 
the need to recognize ~hat employers and workers will frequently have conflicting 
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interests in OHS regulation were easily marginalized in a political climate where 
the labor movement not only lacks clout, but also has bought into the weak form of 
corporatism that OHS bipartism represents. The ,result is that, while personnel 
changes have been made, the ideology and practice of OHS regulation has 
largely been reconstrncted in its pre-Westray fonn. 
Criminal Law Reform-The impediments to and ultimate failure of the 
Westray prosecutions fueled popular support criminal law reforms that would 
overcome at least some of the technical difficulties that have shielded employers 
from being held criminally responsible for reckless conduct that caused death 
and injury to workers. The efforts of trade unions (particularly the USW A) and 
the Westray Families Group to have the Criminal Code amended received a 
substantial boost when the Westray inquiry accepted their submission on this 
point .and recommended that the federal government should amend the criminal 
law as necessary to ensure that corporate executives and directors are held 
accountable for workplace safety (Richard 1997, rec. 73). As well, the fact that 
England and a number of jurisdictions in Australia have either enacted or are 
considering similar kinds of changes to their criminal laws both reflects a 
·widespread crisis of legitimacy over the criminal law's lack of even-handedness 
and makes such changes appear less radical than might otherwise be the case 
(Glasbeek 2004a). But still, the process of reforming the criminal law was pain-
fully slow and difficult. . 
Following the commission recommendation, Alexa McDonough, then the 
leader of the Federal NDP and herself a Nova Scotian, introduced a private 
member's bill in February 1998 aimed to increase the exposure of corporations, 
directors, and officers to criminal liability. Peter McKay, then the Progressive-
Conservative Member of Parliament whose riding includes the Westray mine, also 
introduced a motion calling on the government to implement that recommen-
dation. Neither the bill nor the motion proceeded in that session, but both were 
reintroduced in the next where, by a margin of216 to 15, the House of Commons 
voted to refer McKay's motion to the Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights. In preparation for that meeting, the Steelworkers commissioned 
a national poll in which 85% supported a law that "would establish fines and 
jail terms for corporate executives and directors found to be criminally respon-
sible for harm or injury to employees or members of the public." Thirty-seven 
percent felt that the best way to prevent future Westrays was to make 
corporate directors criminally accountable, while another 31 % supported more 
government inspectors (MacKinnon 2000). As well, the Steelworkers conducted 
an intensive four-day lobby involving members brought to Ottawa from 
around the country. 
At the Committee, members from every political party, including from the 
most conservative, spoke in favor of the motion and a report issued endorsing an 
amendment to the Criminal Code that would ensure that "corporate executives and 
302 I WORKING DISASTERS 
directors are held properly accountable for workplace safety" (Canada 2000). 
It also recommended to the Minister of Justice that legislation be brought forward 
in accordance with the motion and the principles underlying McDonough' s private 
member's bill. Later that fall, the House of Commons concurred in the report, 
but shortly thereafter elections were called and Parliament was dissolved. 
Another large Liberal majority government was returned and the private 
member's bill was reintroduced in February 2001. The House of Commons 
once again voted to send the matter to the Standing Committee, which, held 
hearings in 2002, and issued a report in November calling for legislation dealing 
with the criminal liability of corporations, officers and directors. The govern-
ment accepted this recommendation and on June 12, 200~ introduced a bill 
(Bill 45 2003) that according to the Department of Justice (2003) "sends a clear 
message to employers: those who fail to provide safe workplaces will be dealt 
with severely through the criminal law." The bill passed and received Royal 
Assent on November 7, 2003. It came into force on 31 March 2004, nearly 12 
years after the disaster. 12 
The two most pertinent changes made by the Westray Bill are that it estab-
lishes a new set of legal duties in the Criminal Code and that it makes it easier 
to hold an organization responsible for the acts of its senior officials. The new 
s. 217.l provides: 
Every one who undertakes, or has authority, to direct how another person 
does work or performs a task is under a legal duty to take reasonable steps 
to prevent bodily harm to that person, or any other person, arising from that 
work or harm. 
The effect of the section is to impose individual criminal responsibility quite 
broadly. Anyone with authority to direct work, not just managerial employees, is 
under a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm. This could include, for 
example, the lowest level supervisory employees, a matter that concerns unions 
based on their experience with provincial health and safety prosecutions of 
co-workers, perhaps as a means of demonstrating the regulators' neutrality when 
also charging employers. As well, the law will impose liability for harm done 
to people outside the workplace, a responsibility that is not covered by most 
provincial health and safety laws (Nova Scotia is an exception). To successfully 
prosecute an individual under this section, it will not be enough to establish a 
breach of the relevant provincial health and safety law subject to the defense of 
due ·diligence; rather, it will be necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the individual breached her or hiss. 217.l duty recklessly or with intent. 
To get at employing organizations, the Code was amended to make them 
parties to offences in a broader range of circumstances than in the past. First, 
the law does not just apply to corporations, but to organizations, including 
corporations, partnerships, and trade unions. Second, under the pre-existing law, 
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corporations could only be held responsible for criminal conduct committed by a 
directing mind with policy responsibility. Under Bill C-45 organizational liability 
has been broadened to include criminal conduct· committed at an operational 
level. Third, organizational responsibility has been extended deeper into the 
organization. In the past, corporations were only parties if criminality was found 
at its highest levels. Under the current law, it can be held criminally responsible if 
one of its representatives (which could include employees, agents, and contractors 
as well as directors and partners) is a party to an offense, and if a senior officer 
responsible for a relevant aspect of the organization's activities "departs markedly 
from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected 
to prevent a representative of the organization from being a party."13 Thus, under 
the new law organizations are responsible not only for monitoring the activities 
of their own officers and employees, but for their agents and contractors, and 
corporate directors cannot insulate the organization from liability by sloughing 
off responsibility to senior operating officials lower in the hierarchy. Finally, 
the new law addresses the problem of diffusion of responsibility within the 
organization by allowing the prosecution to prove that senior officers collectively 
departed markedly from the standard of care expected of them. However, it is 
important to note that it will not be sufficient to show that the senior officers 
were negligent in their oversight. The crown will have to prove criminal reck-
lessness to establish a marked departure from the standard of care.14 
It is too early to tell whether the Westray Bill will bring the criminal law 
more fully into OHS regime, by making it an effective weapon in the arsenal 
of OHS regulators and law enforcement officials. The first and, so far, only 
charge under Bill C-45 is against an Ontario man supervising a trench excavation 
performed without proper shoring. The walls collapsed and a worker was killed 
(Keith 2004). The charge has since been dropped. For those who hoped Bill 
C-45 would be used to impose criminal sanctions on corporations, this is an 
inauspicious beginning. Prosecutions aside, the immediate impact of the passage 
of Bill C-45 has been to generate business for professional risk managers (Fraser 
2004; Keith 2004; McGillivray 2004) and, undoubtedly, large employers will 
take some measures to reduce their exposure. While this could include insti-
tuting better health and safety measures in the workplace, they may also adopt 
legal strategies, such as invoking their right to counsel and their right to remain 
silent in the aftermath of a workplace death or serious injury, that do nothing to 
reduce worker risk exposure. In the longer term, the impact will depend, in part, 
on the extent to which the amendments overcome the technical difficulties crown 
prosecutors faced in the past. In twn, this will depend on how the courts interpret 
a number of ambiguous terms in the law. The more important determinant, 
however, will be the extent to which crown prosecutors attempt to use the law. 
This brings us back to the sociological analysis discussed earlier. As long as 
the assumption is made that the workplace is a realm of voluntarism in which 
respectable employers are engaged in the respectable pursuit of profit, then it will 
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remain difficult to convince enforcement officials to resort to criminal 
prosecutions. Indeed, recall that presently they rarely prosecute for violations of 
provincial health and safety laws. However, the enactment of this legislation, and 
the efforts in other jurisdictions to make employers criminally responsible for 
workplace deaths and injuries show that this assumption is being challenged. 
Westray has become a potent cultural and political symbol of unpunished 
employer criminality and the need for legal, institutional and, perhaps ultimately, 
social change to redress this situation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Westray disaster disrnpted the pre-existing OHS regime that had, in 
effect, made private the troubles experienced by the miners and their families. 
It gave them and their supporters a greater public voice and opportunities to 
mobilize institutions of redress in pursuit of accountability for the loss of 26 
lives and reform to prevent future disasters. But in the end, they met with limited 
success in achieving their objectives. 
Monetary compensation was the least problematic because the province's 
workers' compensation system makes the payment of survivors' benefits a routine 
matter, not requiring any assignment of fault. But as a result, the workers' 
compensation system did not address the demands for individual, organizational, 
and systemic accountability. Tort law provides a mechanism for holding indi-
viduals and organizations accountable, but in Canada the statutory bar in workers' 
compensation statutes has virtually eliminated this form of redress, even in the 
aftermath of a disaster caused by serious wrongdoing. The strongest form of public 
accountability is through the criminal law, but though a combination of bungling, 
lack of government support, and technical obstacles, the Westray prosecution 
failed miserably. However, public outrage over employers getting away with 
criminal disregard for the lives of their workers, in conjunction with a broader 
crisis of corporate legitimacy fueled by recent scandals, created a political 
environment in which politicians of all political stripes felt the need to demonstrate 
their commitment to equality before the law, by removing at least some of the 
technical barriers to the successful prosecution of individuals and their employing 
organizations when they grossly neglect their duty to insure that work is performed 
safely. But in the long run, the success of the Westray Bill will depend on whether 
the underlying assumptions about the consensual nature of work relations that 
haye informed health and safety regulation since the nineteenth century are 
changed. Ironically, the Richard commission of inquiry, which provided much 
needed support for criminal law reform, endorsed the very assumptions that have 
undermined all previous efforts to strengthen the enforcement of health and safety 
laws, including the incorporation of the criminal law into the OHS regime. 
Thus, while the legacy of Westray remains uncertain in terms of its impact on 
the OHS regime, it continues to be a potent reminder of the dangers that workers 
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face in a world in which there is systemic pressure on employers to maximize 
profits, even if that means putting production ahead of safety, and on govenunents 
to provide business-friendly regulatory climates. . 
ENDNOTES 
1. Interview with Robert Wells, CUPE Health and Safety Representative, 11 November 
2000. 
2. Twenty days after the explosion the surviving miners voted in favor of the union. 
3. There may also be economic losses to persons who do not suffer injury. In the 
case of Westray, surviving employees were laid off because of the mine's closure. 
The Labor Standards Board, a provincial tribunal, held that 117 miners were 
entitled to 12 weeks of severance pay. However, because the employer is bankrupt, 
the employees, who turned to Nova Scotia government for payment, were 
promised that they will be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the remaining 
company assets. 
4. There was a problem with compensation for at least one Westray miner who suffered 
psychological trauma arising out of his experiences in the mine rescue and recovery 
operations, but he recently won an appeal that awarded him $101,000 in back payments 
and a monthly pension of $675 (Naiberg 2004, pp. 20-21). 
5. Quite independently of the Westray explosion, employers were already pressing 
the government to amend the workers' compensation legislation to address their 
concerns about rising costs and unfunded liabilities. Amendments enacted in 1995 
responded to the employers' cost-cutting agenda, but did not adversely affect the 
Westray families. On the general pattern of North American workers' compensation 
"reforms," see McCluskey (1998). 
6. Workers' compensation boards in Canada have increasingly asserted that prevention 
is an important part of their mandate and have pursued this goal through education 
and the use of economic incentives, principally experience rating. This is not the 
place to engage with the literature on the efficacy of experience rating except to note 
that it also creates incentives to engage in claims management. 9aims management 
was pursued with a vengeance at the Westray mine. Indeed, Curragh was awarded 
a prestigious safety award just prior to the explosion on the basis of its fraudulently 
low claims experience. The award, which had been accepted by one of the miners 
killed in the explosion, was subsequently withdrawn (Comish 1993). 
7. Part of the reason for this difference is that workers' compensation in the United States 
is usually less generous than in Canada and involves lawyers to a far greater extent. 
8. For a somewhat longer discussion with fuller references, see Tucker (1995b). 
9. The dissenting judges would have refused to order a new trial because the conduct 
of the Crown had brought .the administration of justice into disrepute by its failures 
to disclose evidence and its attempts to cover this up and mislead the court. 
10. It is still far more common for employers to be prosecuted under regulatory statutes, 
but these do not have the same normative purchase as criminal prosecutions. 
11. Clifford Frame and Marvin Pelley, two senior Curragh executives, fiercely resisted 
efforts to subpoena them. Eventually, the commission decided to issue its report 
without waiting for their testimony. 
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12. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of organizations), S.C. 2003, 
c. 21. 
13. s. 22.l(b). 
14. For a fuller discussion of the Criminal Code amendments and a critical assessment, 
see Archibald, Jull, and Roach (2004) and Glasbeek (2004b). 
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